Home l A2 Index
Presently holding page for Baylis / Smith chapter notes. I'll put some Goldstein notes here too.

Chapter 01: The globalization of world politics
• Over the last three decades the sheer scale and scope of global interconnectedness has become increasingly evident in every sphere from the economic to the cultural. Sceptics do not regard this as evidence of globalization if that term means something more than simply international independence, i.e. linkages between countries. The key issue becomes what we understand by the term 'globalization'.
• Globalization is evident in the growing extensity, intensity, velocity and deepening impact of worldwide interconnectedness.
• Globalization denotes a shift in the scale of social organization, the emergence of the world as a shared social space, the relative de-territorialization of social, economic and political activity, and the relative de-nationalization of power.
• Globalization can be conceptualized as fundamental shift or transformation in the spatial scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents.
• Globalization is to be distinguished from internationalization and regionalization.
• The contemporary phase of globalization has proved more robust in the aftermath of September 11th than the sceptics recognize.
• Contemporary globalization is a multi-dimensional, uneven, and asymmetrical process.
• Contemporary globalization is best described as thick form of globalization or globalism.
• Globalization is transforming but not burying the Westphalian ideal of sovereign statehood.
• Globalization requires a conceptual shift in our thinking about world politics from a primarily geopolitical perspective to the perspective of globalized or global politics– the politics of worldwide social relations.
• Global politics is more accurately described as distorted global politics because it is afflicted by significant power asymmetries.
• Globalization creates a double democratic deficit in that it places limits on democracy within states and new mechanisms of global governance which lack democratic credentials.
• Global politics has engendered its own global political theory which draws upon cosmopolitan thinking.
• Cosmopolitanism offers an account of the desirability and feasibility of the democratization of global politics.
• Distorted global politics can be interpreted as expressing a contest between the forces of statism and cosmopolitanism in the conduct and management of world affairs.

Chapter 02: The evolution of international society
• International society is an association of member states who not only interact across international borders but also share common purposes, organizations, and standards of conduct.
• There are different historical versions of international society the most important of which is the contemporary global international society.
• Political independence is the core value of international society.
• In understanding international society it is important to keep in mind contrasting group relations, such as empires, which are far more common historically. Some argue that the concept of international society is not incompatible with forms of imperial power, understood as hierarchal relations between states in the global North and South.
• Two forerunner international societies were ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy.
• Two empires that contrasted with these international societies and also served as a historical bridge between them were the Roman Empire and its direct Christian successor in the West, the medieval Respublica Christiana.
• Greek international society was based on the polis and Hellenic culture.
• Italian international society was based on the stato and the strong urban identities and rivalries of Renaissance Italians.
• These small international societies were eventually overwhelmed by neighbouring hegemonic powers.
• The Peace of Westphalia was the first explicit expression of a European society of states, which served as a precedent for all subsequent developments of international society.
• That international society displaced and succeeded the medieval Respublica Christiana.
• It was the external aspect of the development of modern secular states that had to find an orderly and legitimate way to conduct mutual relations without submitting to either superior authority or hegemonic domination from abroad.
• It was the first completely explicit international society, even though it was centered in Europe, with its own diplomatic institutions, formal body of law, and enunciated practices of prudential statecraft, including the balance of power.
• Through their rivalries and wars European states developed the military organization and technology to project their power on a global scale and few non European political systems could block their expansion.
• European international law, diplomacy, and the balance of power came to be applied around the world.
• Indigenous non Western nationalists eventually went into revolt and claimed a right of self determination which led to decolonization and the expansion of international society.
• That was followed by a further expansion after the Cold War, brought about by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and several other communist states.
• During the 1990s, for the first time in history, there was one inclusive international society of global extent.
• Whether this model of international society can endure under US hegemony is the subject of some dispute.
• Today international society is usually conceived as a global social framework of shared norms and values based on state sovereignty.
• An important manifestation of that social framework is the UN Charter.
• But those shared norms and values have provoked unprecedented problems and predicaments of contemporary world politics.
• There is a current debate about the future of state sovereignty and thus also about the future of the contemporary global international society.

Chapter 04: International history, 1945-1990
• Different European powers had different attitudes to decolonization after 1945: some, such as the British, decided to leave while others wished to preserve their Empires, in part (the French) or whole (the Portuguese).
• European powers adopted different attitudes to different regions and countries; e.g. British withdrawal from Asia came much more quickly after 1945 than from Africa.
• The process of decolonization was relatively peaceful in many cases; it led to revolutionary wars in others (Algeria, Malaya and Angola), whose scale and ferocity depended on the attitudes of the colonial power and the nationalist movements.
• The struggle for independence or national liberation became embroiled in Cold War conflicts when the superpowers and/or their allies became involved, e.g. Vietnam.
• Whether decolonization was judged successful depends, in part, on whose perspective you adopt—that of the European power, or the independence movement, or the people themselves.
• There are disagreements about when the Cold War started, why, and who was responsible.
• The Cold War began (or accelerated) in Europe with the failure to implement the agreements reached at Potsdam and Yalta.
• Distinct phases can be seen in East—West relations during which tension and the risk of direct confrontation grew and receded.
• Some civil and regional wars were intensified and prolonged by superpower involvement; others may have been prevented or shortened.
• The end of the Cold War has not resulted in the abolition of nuclear weapons.
• There remains debate about the use of the bomb in 1945, and the effect that this had on the Cold War.
• Nuclear weapons were an important factor in the Cold War. How far the arms race has had a momentum of its own is a matter of debate.
• Agreements on limiting and controlling the growth of nuclear arsenals played an important role in Soviet—American (and East—West) relations.
• States with nuclear weapons agreed on the desirability of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other states.
• Various international crises occurred in which there was the risk of nuclear war. Judging how close we came to nuclear war at these times remains a matter for debate.

Chapter 05: The end of the cold war
• The end of the Cold War was a major historical turning point as measured by changes in the international system, the nation state, and international organizations.
• The term 'Cold War' can refer both to the behavioural characteristics of US–Soviet relations, which fluctuated over the period 1945–89, or to the basic structure of their relations, which remained constant.
• The key structural elements of the Cold War are political and military (above all nuclear) rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, ideological conflict between capitalism and communism, the division of Europe, and the extension of superpower conflict to the Third World.
• The explanation for the end of the Cold War is to be found in the interaction between Soviet bloc failure and the external environment.
• The suddenness of the collapse of communism defied the predictions of experts.
• Gorbachev's accession to power represented the advent of a new generation in the Soviet leadership, though Gorbachev gave little indication early on that he would break the mould of Soviet politics.
• The Soviet Union suffered from systemic economic problems which were compounded in the 1980s by poor harvests and a failure to meet the challenge of the computer revolution.
• Glasnost began with relaxation of censorship which Gorbachev hoped to be able to control, but the process soon eluded his grasp as something approaching a genuine public opinion emerged.
• A combination of glasnost and political restructuring undermined the role of the Communist Party and ultimately the Soviet Union itself which by the end of 1991 had dissolved into separate republics.
• Economic restructuring had the effect of destroying the rationale of the old system without putting viable new mechanisms in its place.
• The end of communism in Eastern Europe was sudden but protest against communist rule was nothing new.
• The Soviet Union had always been forced to acknowledge the existence of national differences and desires for autonomy among Eastern European nations and had tried to maintain a balance between maintaining the integrity of the Soviet bloc and allowing some diversity.
• The Polish union Solidarity illustrated the deep currents of dissent, whose momentum was maintained even after the banning of the organization in 1981.
• A catalyst for the revolutionary process was Gorbachev's abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for Eastern Europe.
• Failure of the attempts by Eastern European leaders to stem the tide of revolution in 1989 by installing new personnel illustrated the degree to which the crisis of communism was systemic.
• Opinion about the American role in ending the Cold War has tended to polarize: either the Reagan hard line forced the Soviet Union to its knees or Reagan's policies were immaterial or actually served to prolong the Cold War.
• Soviet–American relations did not change overnight with the advent of Gorbachev. The United States responded cautiously to his initiatives.
• Gorbachev's new thinking in foreign policy overthrew the conventional wisdom of Soviet foreign policy.
• Gorbachev's concessions, which helped to produce the INF Treaty and generally improve the climate of Soviet–American relations, were promoted initially in a controlled fashion but tended to become more unilateral and sweeping as the pace of domestic reform quickened.
• The story is not simply one of Soviet concessions. The United States made some significant movement too, indicating that a polarized interpretation of the end of the Cold War is too simple and schematic.
• The causes of the end of the Cold War are to be found not only in internal and external conditions considered separately but in the interaction between the two.
• The separation of the communist bloc from capitalism, though not apparently disadvantageous to communism until the 1970s, left it at an increasing relative disadvantage to the capitalist West.
• Growing consciousness of relative disadvantage was a factor in the collapse of communism.
• The end of the Cold War offered grounds for both pessimistic and optimistic speculation.
• Both the above approaches could find evidence for their contentions in the varied and conflicting tendencies in post Cold War international developments.
• The novelty of the post Cold War international system lay not in the existence of instability and conflict but in the environment in which conflict took place.
• In the aftermath of the Cold War, globalization and the future of the United States were considered by many scholars to be closely linked, though countervailing processes to both could be expected to develop.

Chapter 06: From the cold war to the war on terror
• The Cold War was a complex relationship combining elements of both conflict and stability.
• Most experts assumed that the Cold War would go on.
• The end of the Cold War has been interpreted in at least five different ways.
• While some historians argue that 1989 did not turn the world upside down, most accept that it was a crucial turning point.
• The 1990s are now viewed as the high moment of liberalism and Francis Fukuyama's concept of the 'end of history' as the most influential liberal theory of the post-Cold War era.
• Liberal optimism about the post Cold War rested on three assumptions: that democracies do not go to war with one another; that institutions can overcome the logic of anarchy; and that modern globalized capitalism binds states more closely together.
• Realists are not realists because they are 'realistic', but rather because they have what they believe is a more historically rooted analysis about the way the international system has always operated and operates now.
• Mearsheimer's argument about going 'back to the future' is built upon the basic realist argument that the Cold War system of bipolarity led to a 'long peace' that might now be undermined by its dissolution.
• Kaplan's 'coming anarchy' builds on the experience of what he terms the 'dying regions' of the world—like parts of Africa—and asserts that the West ignores what is happening in these areas at its risk.
• Huntington's thesis about the 'clash of civilizations' takes as its starting point the inevitability of conflict as a historically proven fact, and goes on to argue that the next key conflicts in the world will not be economic or ideological but cultural.
• Some of the more significant radical writers on world politics developed their ideas outside of—and in opposition to—mainstream international relations.
• Noam Chomsky is a famous best-selling author in the United States whose critique of what he terms the 'American empire' takes as its point of intellectual departure the notion that in the new world order very little has fundamentally changed – other than America’s increased capacity to get it own way.
• Robert Cox has a more established reputation in the field of international political economy, but like Chomsky believes that the structures of hegemony established in one era still remain intact.
• Naomi Klein was less a systematic thinker than the self-defined activist voice of an anti-globalization movement opposed to consumerism and faceless corporations.
• The existence of communism limited the geographic range of capitalism; the end of the Cold War therefore led to globalization and the more rapid spread of market principles around the whole world.
• The short hand term used to define global economic policy in the post-communist era was the 'Washington consensus', describing a strict set of economic criteria that all countries had to adhere to, whatever the welfare consequences.
• After the Cold War, there was a detectable trend in the advanced capitalist countries towards a more economically driven foreign policy.
• Critics of globalization made a powerful case, but were unable to provide a serious economic alternative to the market.
• In the late 1980s there were many writers like Paul Kennedy who argued that the United States was in decline.
• This once fashionable view virtually disappeared during the 1990s. A combination of factors including the early defeat of Iraq in 1991, the collapse of the USSR, the long economic boom in America, and high levels of military expenditure, continued to guarantee US hegemony.
• The major problem facing US foreign policy after the Cold War was not isolationism but an inability in the absence of a defining enemy to formulate a clear grand strategy.
• The attempt to build a popular functioning market economy in Russia thus far has been unsuccessful.
• However, there is too much at stake for the West to now abandon Russia—in spite of human rights abuses in Chechnya and the election of Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, to the office of President.
• Even if economic reform has been unable to restore Russia, because Russia is now so weak it does not represent a serious problem internationally.
• China's rise in the 1990s has been on the basis of an economic system that is an almost unique blend of capitalism and communism.
• Policy makers in the United States in particular are more concerned about the great business opportunities in China than they are about political freedom.
• However, over time, many predict that market reform and China's integration in the global economy will lead to irreversible political change.
• Meanwhile, many in the Asia Pacific region regard China as the number one threat.
• Until the second half of the 1990s the accepted wisdom was that Asia Pacific had achieved economic take off: many even predicted a new 'Pacific Century'.
• The Asian economic crisis that began in 1997 has led to a massive shake out and profound social and political consequences.
• The crisis also had a major impact on the stability of the world financial system.
• Since 2000 there has been economic recovery in the region; however, this is now being driven by China as much as Japan.
• Europe has been a major testing ground for liberal and realist international relations theories.
• The key political question facing Europe after 1989 was how to manage the process of German unification.
• The expansion and integration of the European economic space has not been accompanied by a parallel development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.
• The collapse of Yugoslavia was a major test which the European Union failed to pass.
• The United States remains the key provider of security in Europe.
• Many experts now question the use of the term 'Third World'.
• In the 1990s, poverty remains a reality for the majority of people.
• The end of the Cold War has produced contradictory results in the less developed countries.
• The political tensions caused by underdevelopment cannot be isolated from the advanced countries.
• 11 September 2001 marked the end of the post-Cold War era.
• The two key factors shaping world politics since 9/11 have been Islamic terrorism and the US-led war on terror.
• US foreign policy has come under sustained attack after it decided to go to war against Iraq.
• The world is now a less stable place than it was before 9/11

Chapter 13: International and global security in the post-cold war era
• Security is a 'contested concept'.
• The meaning of security has been broadened to include political, economic, societal, and environmental, as well as military, aspects.
• Differing arguments exist about the tension between national and international security.
• Different views have emerged about the significance of 9/11 for the future of international security.
• Debates about security have traditionally focused on the role of the state in international relations.
• Realists and neo-realists emphasize the perennial problem of insecurity.
• The 'security dilemma' is seen by some writers as the essential source of conflict between states.
• Trust is often difficult between states, according to Realists, because of the problem of cheating.
• Realists also point out the problem of 'relative gains' whereby states compare their gains with those of other states when making their decisions about security.
• 'Contingent realists' regard themselves as 'structural realists' or 'neo-realists'.
• They believe standard 'neo realism' is flawed for three main reasons: they reject the competition bias in the theory; they do not accept that states are only motivated by 'relative gains'; they believe the emphasis on cheating is exaggerated.
• 'Contingent realists' tend to be more optimistic about cooperation between states than traditional 'neo-realists'.
• Supporters of the concept of 'mature anarchy' also accept that structure is a key element in determining state behaviour.
• There is, however, a trend towards 'mature anarchy', especially in Europe, which focuses on the growing importance of international security considerations.
• This is occurring because more states in the contemporary world are recognizing that their own security is interdependent with the security of other states.
• The more this happens the greater the chances of dampening down the security dilemma.
• Neo-realists reject the significance of international institutions in helping many to achieve peace and security.
• Contemporary politicians and academics, who write under the label of Liberal Institutionalism, however, see institutions as an important mechanism for achieving international security.
• Liberal Institutionalists accept many of the assumptions of Realism about the continuing importance of military power in international relations but argue that institutions can provide a framework for cooperation which can help to overcome the dangers of security competition between states.
• Democratic peace theory emerged in the 1980s. The main argument was that the spread of democracy would lead to greater international security.
• Democratic peace theory is based on a Kantian logic—emphasizing three elements—republican democratic representation, an ideological commitment to human rights, and transnational interdependence.
• Wars between democracies are seen as being rare and they are believed to settle mutual conflicts of interest without the threat or use of force more often than non-democratic states.
• Supporters of democratic peace ideas do not reject the insights of Realism, but they reject 'vulgar realism's' preoccupation with the idea of war of all against all. They argue that internal norms and institutions matter.
• Collective security theorists take power seriously but argue that it is possible to move beyond the self help world of Realism.
• Collective security is based on three main conditions—that states must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo; that they must broaden their view of national interest to take in the interests of the international community; and that states must overcome their fear and learn to trust each other.
• Collective security aims to create a more effective system of 'regulated institutionalized balancing' rather than relying on the unregulated balancing which takes place under anarchy.
• Collective security is believed to contribute to the creation of a more benign international system.
• Despite past failures, supporters argue that there is an opportunity to try collective security again with more success in the post Cold War world.
• Social Constructivist thinkers base their ideas on two main assumptions; (1) that the fundamental structures of international politics are socially constructed; and (2) that changing the way we think about international relations can help to bring about greater international security.
• Social Constructivist thinkers accept many of the assumptions of neo-realism, but they reject the view that 'structure' consists only of material capabilities. They stress the importance of social structure defined in terms of shared knowledge and practices as well as material capabilities.
• Social Constructivists argue that material things acquire meaning only through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.
• Power politics and realpolitik, emphasized by realists, are seen as being derived from shared knowledge which is self-fulfilling.
• Social Constructivists can be pessimistic or optimistic about changing international relations and achieving international security.
• Critical security theorists argue that too much emphasis is given by most approaches to the state.
• Some critical security theorists wish to shift the main referent to the individual and suggest that 'emancipation' is the key to greater domestic and international security.
• Feminist writers argue that gender tends to be left out of the literature on international security, despite the impact of war on women.
• Feminist writers also argue that bringing gender issues back in will result in a reconceptualization of the study of international security.
• Post-modernists emphasize the importance of ideas and discourse in thinking about international security.
• Post modernists aim to replace the 'discourse of realism' with a 'communitarian discourse'.
• Realist and post-modernist approaches have very different epistemologies.
• Post-modernists try to reconceptualize the debate about global security by looking at new questions which have been ignored by traditional approaches.
• There is a belief amongst post-modernist writers that the nature of international politics can be changed by altering the way we think and talk about security.
• Supporters of the 'global society school' argue that the end of the twentieth century witnessed an accelerating process of globalization.
• Globalization can be seen in the fields of economic development, communications, and culture. Global social movements are also a response to new risks associated with the environment, poverty, and weapons of mass destruction.
• Globalization is occurring at a time when the fragmentation of the nation-state is taking place, encouraged in particular by the end of the cold war.
• The 'fracture of statehood' is giving rise to new kinds of conflict within states rather than between states which the state system cannot deal with. This has helped encourage an emerging politics of global responsibility.
• Globalism is also encouraged by the spread of regional security communities and the development of a growing consensus on norms and beliefs.
• There are disputes about whether globalization will contribute to the weakening of the state or simply to its transformation, and over whether a global society can be created which will usher in a new period of peace and security.
• One of the critical contemporary arguments about global security centres on the issue of continuity and change.
• Different theorists have contrasting views about whether global security has changed fundamentally since 9/11.
• Globalization appears to have an ambivalent impact on international security.

Chapter 14: International political economy in an age of globalization
• Immediately after the Second World War international institutions were created to facilitate co operation in the world-economy and to ensure countries did not pursue the kinds of beggar-thy-neighbour policies which had contributed to the Great Depression.
• The onset of the cold war postponed the operation of these institutions, as the United States stepped in directly to manage the reconstruction of Europe and the international monetary system based on the dollar.
• The Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates and capital flows operated until its breakdown in 1971 when the US announced it would no longer convert the dollar to gold.
• The 1970s were marked by a lack of international economic cooperation among the industrialized countries, which floated their exchange rates and indulged in new forms of trade protectionism.
• Developing countries' dissatisfaction with the international system came to a head in the 1970s when they pushed unsuccessfully for a new international economic order.
• The debt crisis in the 1980s thrust the IMF into a new role, causing its work to overlap with that of the World Bank.
• Trade negotiations in the 1980s produced a new world trade organization.
• The rise of IPE as a prominent subject in international relations was due in part to the decline in US economic preponderance and the challenge to traditional notions of power and security posed by the US failure in Vietnam.
• The rise in importance of IPE was also associated with new economic challenges in the 1970s, including the OPEC oil price rise and the developing countries' push for a NIEO which highlighted theories focusing on the nature and structure of the world-economy.
• The economic challenges of both the end of the cold war and globalization have further underlined the centrality of IPE in the study of international relations.
• The labels Liberal, Mercantilist, and Marxist usefully describe three different analytical and moral starting points for the study of global economic relations.
• The Liberal (or neo-liberal) perspective presents global economic order as the result of the relatively unfettered operation of markets, guided by rational individual policy makers.
• Mercantilists describe the world-economy as an arena for inter state competition for power.
• Marxist analyses focus on the structure of the world capitalist economy, proposing that state and government choices simply reflect the preferences of those who own the means of production.
• The three traditional perspectives usefully highlight different actors, different processes, and different 'levels of analysis' in the study of IPE.
• Rational choice explains outcomes in IPE as the result of actors' choices which are assumed always to be rationally power or utility maximizing within given particular incentives and institutional constraints.
• Political economy applies rational choice to sub-state actors such as coalitions, interest groups, and bureaucrats in order to explain outcomes in a state's foreign economic policy.
• Institutionalists apply rational choice to states in their interactions with other states in order to explain international cooperation in economic affairs.
• Constructivist approaches pay more attention to how governments, states, and other actors construct their preferences, highlighting the role of identities, beliefs, traditions, and values in this process.
• Neo-Gramscians highlight that actors define and pursue their interests within a structure of ideas, culture, and knowledge which itself is shaped by hegemonic powers.
• Globalization poses some new constraints for all states, including the most powerful. In particular, the emergence of global capital markets means that all governments have to be cautious in their choice of exchange rate and interest rate policies.
• On other issues of economic policy, wealthier and more powerful countries are less constrained by globalization than is portrayed by the globalists. This is because the firms and investors whom governments are keen to attract are not solely concerned with levels of taxation and wages. They are equally concerned with factors such as the skills of the workforce, the provision of infrastructure, and proximity to markets.
• At the international level the more powerful states in the system get to set (and enforce) many of the rules of the new global economy.
• Weaker states in the system not only must accept and abide by rules set by others, but also have little capacity to manage their integration into the world economy. These states do not enjoy much sovereignty or independence of policy choice in the global economy.
• Institutionalists argue that international institutions will play an important and positive role in ensuring that globalization results in widely spread benefits in the world-economy.
• Realists and neo-realists reject the institutionalist argument on the grounds that it does not account for the unwillingness of states ever to sacrifice power relative to other states.
• Constructivists pay more attention to how governments, states and other actors construct their preferences, highlighting the role that state identities, dominant beliefs, and ongoing debates and contestation play in this process.

Chapter 15: International law
• States have strong incentives to free themselves from the insecurities of international anarchy.
• States face common coordination and collaboration problems, yet cooperation remains difficult under anarchy.
• To facilitate cooperation, states create international institutions, of which three levels exist in modern international society: constitutional institutions; fundamental institutions; and issue-specific institutions, or ‘regimes’.
• We are concerned with fundamental institutions, of which international law is one of the most important.
• Modern international law is a historical artefact, a product of the revolutions in thought and practice that transformed the governance of European states after the French Revolution (1789).
• Prior to the French Revolution, in the ‘Age of Absolutism’, law was understood principally as the command of a legitimate superior, and international law was seen a command of God, derived from natural law. In the modern period law as been seen come to be seen as something contracted between legal subjects, or their representatives, and international law has been seen as the expression of the mutual will of nations.
• Because of its historical roots, the modern institution of international law has a number of distinctive characteristics, informed largely by the values of political liberalism.
• The most distinctive characteristics of the modern institution of international law are its multilateral form of legislation, its consent based form of legal obligation, its language and practice of justification, and its discourse of institutional autonomy.
• So long as international law was designed to facilitate international order it was circumscribed in key ways: states were the principle subjects and agents of international law; international law was concerned with the regulation of inter-state relations; and the scope of international law was confined to questions of order.
• The quest for global governance is pushing international law into new areas, raising questions about whether international law is transforming into a form of supranational law.
• Individuals, and to some extent collectivities, are gradually acquiring rights and responsibilities under international law, establishing their status as both subjects and agents under international law.
• Non-governmental actors are becoming increasingly important in the development and codification of international legal norms.
• International law is increasingly affecting domestic legal regimes and practices, and the rules of the international legal system are no longer confined to issues of order. As international humanitarian law evolves, issues of global justice are permeating the international legal order.
• A plethora of theories have emerged to explain the nature, function, and importance of modern international law.
• Realists argue that international law is only important when it serves the interests of powerful states. Yet they struggle to explain how strong states come to be constrained by law, how weak actors can use law to achieve valuable political outcomes, and why we have an ever expanding and complex international legal order, particularly in areas that cannot easily be reduced to the narrow self-interests of powerful states.
• Neo-liberals explain how self-interested states come to construct dense networks of international legal regimes. The approach is limited, however, by their inability to explain the development of law in areas where the self-interests of states are weak or unclear; by their failure to explain the origins of the modern system of international law; and by their blindness to the way in which international law constitutes the identities and interests of states.
• Constructivists treat international law as part of the normative structures that condition state and non-state agency in international relations. Like other social norms, they emphasize the way in which law constitutes actors' identities, interests, and strategies. The principal weakness of constructivism, however, is that its account of international law is under specified, particularly in the area of distinguishing social from legal norms.
• New liberals emphasize the domestic origins of state preferences and, in turn, international law. Within International Law, they stress the need to disaggregate the state to understand transnational legal integration and interaction, and they prioritize international humanitarian law. The principal limitation of this perspective is that it neglects the role that international law can play in constituting the domestic realm.
• The New Haven School points to the emergence of a global public order, characterized by processes of global authoritative decision, from which international law emanates. These processes, and the values they embody, provide the principal source of international law’s authority. Unfortunately, this approach fails in its own attempt to transcend positivism and naturalism.
• Critical legal studies concentrates on the way in which the inherent Liberalism of international law seriously curtails its radical potential. The problem is, however, that critical legal scholars often fail to recognize the emancipatory effects of international law, particularly the way in which weak actors have been able to use international law lever genuine reform in their states.

Chapter 16: International regimes
• Regimes represent an important feature of globalization.
• There is a growing number of global regimes being formed.
• The term regimes, and social science approaches to them, are recent but fit into a long-standing tradition of thought about international law.
• The onset of détente, loss of hegemonic status by the USA, and the growing awareness of environmental problems sensitized social scientists to the need for a theory of regimes.
• Liberal Institutionalists and Realists have developed competing approaches to the analysis of regimes.
• Regime theory is an attempt initiated in the 1970s by social scientists to account for the existence of rule-governed behaviour in the anarchic international system.
• Regimes have been defined by principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures.
• Regimes can be classified in terms of the formality of the underlying agreements and the degree of expectation that the agreements will be observed. Full-blown, tacit, and dead-letter regimes can be identified.
• Regimes now help to regulate international relations in many spheres of activity.
• The market is used by Liberal Institutionalists as an analogy for the anarchic international system.
• In a market/international setting, public goods get underproduced and public bads get overproduced.
• Liberal Institutionalists draw on the Prisoners' Dilemma game to account for the structural impediments to regime formation.
• A hegemon, 'the shadow of the future', and an information-rich environment promote collaboration and an escape route from Prisoners' Dilemmas.
• Realists argue that liberal institutionalists ignore the importance of power when examining regimes.
• Realists draw on the 'Battle of the Sexes' to illuminate the nature of coordination and its link to power in an anarchic setting.

Chapter 17: Diplomacy
• Diplomacy is a key concept in world politics. It refers to a process of communication and negotiation between states and other international actors.
• Diplomacy began in the ancient world but took on a recognizably modern form from the fifteenth century onwards with the establishment of the permanent embassy.
• By the end of the nineteenth century all states had a network of embassies abroad linked to foreign departments at home. Diplomacy had also become an established profession.
• The First World War was a 'watershed' in the history of diplomacy. The perceived failure of diplomacy to prevent this war led to a demand for a 'new' diplomacy that would be less secretive and more subject to democratic control. The outbreak of the Second World War revealed the limits of the 'new' diplomacy.
• Cold war diplomacy relates to the period after the Second World War when international relations were dominated by a global confrontation between the superpowers and their allies. The imperative need to avoid a nuclear war but also to 'win' the Cold War produced a very delicate, dangerous form of diplomacy.
• The end of the cold war produced a new mood of optimism that diplomacy could resolve all major international problems. Such optimism quickly dissipated when a host of new problems and old problems in a new guise emerged.
• The war against terrorism after 11 September 2001 has posed a major challenge to the role of diplomacy in global politics. This challenge has been framed within a debate about the appropriate relationship between hard and soft instruments of power.
• Diplomacy plays a key role in the foreign policies of states and other international actors.
• A diplomatic 'machinery' (minimally a foreign department and overseas representation) performs important functions in the making and the implementation of foreign policy.
• Diplomacy involves persuading other actors to do (or not to do) what you want (do not want) them to do. To be effective, ('pure') diplomacy may need to be supplemented by other instruments, but negotiating skills are central to the art of diplomacy.
• Diplomacy combined with other instruments (military, economic, subversion) is called mixed diplomacy. Here, diplomacy becomes a communications channel through which the use or threatened use of other instruments is transmitted to other parties.
• Diplomacy usually has comparative advantages over other instruments in terms of availability and cost.
• Developing states are handicapped as effective international actors by having a relatively under-developed diplomatic machinery and by a restricted range of policy instruments.
• Even the most powerful sates are no longer the only significant international actors. Bilateral state-to-state diplomacy has been increasingly supplemented by multilateral forms of diplomacy.
• International organizations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental, have become significant diplomatic actors. With at least a rudimentary diplomatic machinery, they can communicate their interests and deploy their resources to influence the outcome of negotiations.
• Complex multilateral types of diplomacy have evolved at the regional level and have reached their most developed form in Europe.
• In complex, multilateral negotiations, diplomacy has become less an art form and more a management process reflecting high levels of interdependence between societies.
• There is now a lively debate about the extent to which states and the state system remain, or should remain, the major vehicles for global diplomacy. Globalization challenges a traditional state-based diplomacy but there are indications that states are adapting to these changes. It is certainly too soon to conclude that state-based diplomacy does not remain highly significant in global diplomacy.

Chapter 18: The United Nations
• The United Nations was established to preserve peace between states after the Second World War.
• In a number of ways, the institutions of the United Nations reflected lessons learned from its predecessor, the League of Nations.
• The institutions and mechanisms of the United Nations reflect both the demands of Great Power politics (ie. Security Council veto) and universalism. They also reflect demands to address the needs and interests of people, as well as the needs and interest of states. The tensions and balance between these various demands have been a key feature of UN development.
• The cold war and the decolonization process had discouraged more active involvement by the United Nations within states.
• After the cold war, it became more difficult for states and diplomats to accept that what happened within states was of no concern to outsiders.
• It became more common for governments to see active membership in the United Nations as serving their national interest as well as being morally right.
• By the mid-1990s the UN had become involved in maintaining international peace and security in three main ways: by resisting aggression between states, by attempting to resolve disputes within states (civil wars), and by focusing on conditions within states, including economic, social and political conditions.
• New justifications for intervention in states were being considered by the 1990s, but no consensus has been reached.
• Nonetheless, most operations of the United Nations were justified in the traditional way: as a response to a threat to international peace and security.
• Any relaxation of the traditional principle of non-intervention had to be treated very cautiously, and new methods of approval in the UN could be advisable.
• The number of institutions within the UN system that address economic and social issues has significantly increased. Several Programmes and Funds were created in response to Global Conferences.
• Coordination between the various economic and social organisations has been problematic.
• Despite a shortage of funds and coordination problems, the UN has done important work in key economic and social areas.
• In the mid to late 1990s under the leadership of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the UN embarked on an overarching reform effort.
• Reform of the economic and social arrangements of the UN aimed at improving coordination, eliminating duplication, and clarifying spheres of responsibility.
• These efforts strengthened the norms of the multilateral system.

Chapter 19: Transnational actors and international organizations in global politics
• The concept of the 'state' has three very different meanings: a legal person, a political community, and a government.
• The countries and governments around the world may be equal in law, but have few political similarities. Many governments control less resources than many transnational actors.
• It cannot be assumed that all country-based political systems are more coherent than global systems, particularly as national loyalties do not match country boundaries.
• By abandoning the language of 'states' and 'non state' actors, we can admit the possibility of theorizing about many types of actors in global politics. By distinguishing government from society and nation from country, we can ask whether private groups, companies, and national minorities in each country engage in transnational relations.
• The ability of TNCs to change transfer prices means that they can evade taxation or government controls on their international financial transactions.
• The ability of TNCs to use triangulation means individual governments cannot control their country's international trade.
• The ability of TNCs to move production from one country to another means individual governments are constrained in regulating and taxing companies.
• The structure of authority over TNCs generates the potential for intense conflict between governments, when the legal authority of one government has extraterritorial impact on the sovereignty of another government.
• In some areas of economic policy, governments have lost sovereignty and regulation now has to be exercised at the global level rather than by governments acting independently.
• Effective action against transnational criminals by individual governments is difficult for the same reasons as control of TNCs is difficult.
• Groups using violence to achieve political goals generally do not achieve legitimacy, but in exceptional circumstances they may be recognized as national liberation movements and take part in diplomacy.
• The transnational activities of criminals and guerrillas shift problems of the domestic policy of countries into the realm of global politics.
• Terrorism may be particular to individual countries, have transnational aspects or be carried out by groups in a transnational network, but it is not a single political force.
• Most transnational actors can expect to gain recognition as NGOs by the UN, provided they are not individual companies, criminals, or violent groups, and they do not exist solely to oppose an individual government.
• The ECOSOC statute provides an authoritative statement that NGOs have a legitimate place in intergovernmental diplomacy.
• The creation of a global economy leads to the globalization of unions, commercial bodies, the professions, and scientists in international NGOs, which participate in the relevant international regimes.
• Governments can no longer control the flow of information across the borders of their country.
• Improved communications make it more likely that NGOs will operate transnationally and make it very simple and cheap for them to do so.
• NGOs from each country may combine in four ways, as international NGOs, as advocacy networks, as caucuses, and as governance networks.
• International organizations are structures for political communication. They are systems that constrain the behaviour of their members.
• Governments form intergovernmental organizations and transnational actors form international non-governmental organizations. In addition governments and transnational actors accord each other equal status by jointly creating hybrid international NGOs.
• International organizations are more than the collective will of their members. They have a distinct impact upon other global actors.
• The high politics/low politics, distinction is used to marginalize transnational actors. It is invalid because politics does not reduce to these two categories.
• A simple concept of power will not explain outcomes. Military and economic resources are not the only capabilities: communication facilities, information, authority, and status are also important political assets. In addition, an ability to use the interaction processes to mobilize support will contribute to influence over policy.
• Different policy domains contain different actors, depending upon the salience of the issues being debated.
• TNCs gain influence through the control of economic resources. NGOs gain influence through possessing information, gaining high status and communicating effectively. TNCs and NGOs have been the main source of economic and political change in global politics.

Chapter 21: Terrorism
• Agreement on what constitutes terrorism continues to be difficult given the range of potential acts involving violence.
• Terrorism, or acts of violence by sub-state groups, has been separated from criminal acts on the basis of the purpose for which violence is applied, namely political change.
• Terrorist groups succeed when their motivations or grievances are perceived to be legitimate by a wider audience. Disproportionate or heavy-handed responses by states to acts of terrorism serve to legitimize terrorist groups.
• The definition of globalization, as with terrorism, is open to subjective interpretation but the technologies associated with globalization have improved terrorist capabilities.
• Many of the technologies and processes associated with globalization have enabled terrorism to have an impact internationally since 1968.
• The majority of transnational terrorist attacks from 1979 onwards targeted American citizens and symbols.
• The collapse of the Soviet Union denied leftist groups their major source of direct or indirect sponsorship, allowing the rise of religious terrorist groups.
• Explanations for terrorist violence based exclusively on the cultural, economic, and religious aspects of globalization provide insights into the underlying motivations and causes for terrorism but lack a holistic understanding of the problem.
• The current wave of terrorist violence uses religious justifications to legitimize the killing of non-combatants.
• Religion may be a powerful motivating element for terrorists, but the ultimate purpose for which violence is applied is the seizing and remolding of the controls of a state.
• Explanations for terrorist violence based exclusively on the cultural, economic, and religious aspects of globalization provide insights into the underlying motivations and causes for terrorism but lack a holistic understanding of the problem.
• The current wave of terrorist violence uses religious justifications to legitimize the killing of non-combatants.
• Religion may be a powerful motivating element for terrorists, but the ultimate purpose for which violence is applied is the seizing and remolding of the controls of a state.
• Elements of globalization that permit the rapid exchange of ideas and goods can also be levered and exploited by terrorist groups.
• The technologies associated with globalization allow terrorists to operate in a highly distributed global 'network' that shares information and allows small cells to conduct highly coordinated, lethal attacks.
• Globalization may allow some terrorist groups to acquire, manufacture, and use weapons of mass destructions in order to conduct catastrophic attacks.
• States, individually and collectively, have political, military, legal, economic, and technologies advantages in the struggle against terrorist groups.
• Differences between states over the nature and scope of the current terrorist threat, and the most appropriate responses to combat it, reflect subjective characterizations based on national biases and experiences.

Chapter 22: Nuclear proliferation
• Nuclear weapon production requires a broad-based technological infrastructure and individuals with key scientific and technical skills.
• Nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons differ in their management of the chain reaction, and in the nature of the energy produced.
• In 1948, the United Nations introduced the category known as Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD), which incluided atomic explosive weapons and radioactive material weapons.
• More recently, a new category has appeared know as CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities).
• Nuclear weapons produce energy in three forms–blast, heat and nuclear radiation–and the phenomenon know as electro-magneitc pulse (EMP).
• Nuclear weapons were used at the end of the Second World War and have not been used in conflict since that time.
• The testing of thermonuclear weapons indicated the greater explosive capacity ofthis type of weapon, although the trend in recent years have been towards weapon designs with much lower yields.
• The nature of nuclear weapons and the dissemination of the capabilities to manufacture them around the world since 1945 makes the issue of nuclear proliferation a good illustration of the globalization of world politics.
• The end of the cold war and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union has generated new problems concerning nuclear proliferation.
• Greater attention has recently been paid to the theoretical aspects of nuclear proliferation and anti-proliferation.
• A debate has emerged over the merits of the further proliferation/spread of nuclear weapons.
• Because of new proliferation challenges generated by what some analysts call the 'second nuclear age’, a debate has begun over whether the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be supplemented or supplanted by a new more flexible approach to the problems of global nuclear governance.
• A major element of the nuclear proliferation process is the acquisition of the key technologies to produce fissile materials to construct either a fission (nuclear) or fusion (thermonuclear) weapon.
• The effects of nuclear weapons are considerable and are manifest in the form of blast, heat, and nuclear radiation.
• Since 1945, the spread of nuclear technology for civil and military purposes has meant that states beyond the five which possess nuclear weapons now have the capacity to produce nuclear devices at relatively short notice, if they have not already done so.
• Over the same period the structure of the civil nuclear trading market has also changed, leading to proliferation concerns because there are more nuclear suppliers around, including transnational supply networks operating outside the established export control guidelines.
• There has also been a diffusion of ballistic missile and space launch technology since 1945.
• A debate over the merits of deploying defensive systems to counter ballistic missiles has emerged and the ABM Treaty agreed in 1972 between the United States and the former Soviet Union is no longer in force.
• Over time, the characterization of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons has become more complex.
• There are also difficulties associated with determining whether nuclear proliferation has actually occurred due to technical ambiguities and the observation that a nuclear capability can be constructed without the need for a nuclear test.
• A number of states have the potential to manufacture nuclear weapons if they wanted, and a few actually embarked on military nuclear programmes before abandoning them.
• The role of non-state actors and transnational nuclear supply networks have added a further dimension to the nuclear proliferation issue.
• There is an ongoing task of ensuring the safety and security of nuclear materials around the world and efforts have been made to improve the prospects of personnel who formerly worked in the Soviet Union's nuclear weapon complex.
• The complexity surrounding compliance and non-compliance with international obligations has been a key feature of debate since the early 1990s.
• Nuclear control and anti-proliferation measures have been evolving since the end of the Second World War.
• The IAEA has established a global safeguards system.
• Attempts to implement a CTBT and negotiate a fissile material cut-off have stalled following a period of renewed impetus after 1995.
• A number of NWFZs have been negotiated.
• The NPT now has 189 parties, although three key states remain non-signatories.
• Since 1987, the MTCR has been operating as an export control agreement among suppliers to constrain the proliferation of missile technology and a new measures, The Hague Code of Conduct, was introduced in 2002.
• In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely and review conferences have been held every five years since 1970.
• Since 1995, the NPT has encountered several challenges related to new incidences of nuclear testing, attempts to achieve universality of the Treaty, disposal of fissile material, compliance, and verification.
• It has been suggested that a 'second nuclear age' has emerged and this raises new risks for nuclear proliferation in the future.
• New measures have been implemented in response to the continuing globalization of the nuclear proliferation issue.

Chapter 25: Humanitarian intervention in world politics
• Traditionally, intervention has been defined as a forcible breach of sovereignty that interferes in a state's internal affairs.
• The legality of forcible humanitarian intervention is a matter of dispute between restrictionists and counter restrictionists.
• States will not intervene for primarily humanitarian reasons.
• States should not place their armed forces in harm’s way for primarily humanitarian reasons as this violates the compact between state and citizen.
• A new legal right of humanitarian intervention would be vulnerable to abuse as states employed humanitarian claims to cloak the pursuit of traditional national interests.
• States will apply principles of humanitarian intervention selectively.
• In the absence of a consensus on what principles should govern a right of individual or collective humanitarian intervention, such a right would undermine international order.
• Humanitarian intervention will always be based on the cultural preferences of the powerful.
• Solidarism is committed to developing consensual moral principles that would legitimate a practice of humanitarian intervention in international society.
• Counter-restrictionists argue for a legal right of forcible humanitarian intervention based on an interpretation of the human rights provisions in the UN Charter and the existence of customary international law.
• A legal right of humanitarian intervention enables intervention but it does not determine it. To ensure intervention in cases where it is desperately needed states would have to recognize a duty or obligation to act.
• Humanitarian considerations do not seem to have been decisive in the decisions of Vietnam and Tanzania to intervene.
• Vietnam and Tanzania justified their interventions in terms of the traditional norms of the society of states.
• The reluctance of the society of states to legitimize humanitarian intervention reflected fears about setting precedents which could erode the non-intervention principle.
• In the polarized world of the late 1970s, reactions to the Tanzanian and Vietnamese interventions were conditioned by cold war geopolitics.
• Media images of human suffering have led Western publics to pressurize their leaders into post-cold war humanitarian interventions.
• Humanitarian intervention secures its greatest legitimation when it is done through the Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the Security Council.
• Forcible humanitarian intervention can alleviate immediate human suffering but does not always tackle the underlying causes of human suffering.
• Humanitarian outcomes should be conceptualized in terms of a continuum ranging from short term (immediate relief of suffering) to long term (addressing the underlying political causes of the suffering).
• Non forcible humanitarian intervention is characterized by the pacific activities of states, international organizations, NGOs and INGOs in the global humanitarian community.
• INGOs and NGOs have succeeded in broadening the humanitarian agenda to include issues of development, the environment, and women's rights.
• Dominant Western political and economic elites encourage a crisis management approach to complex humanitarian emergencies that does nothing to tackle the underlying causes of these emergencies.
• Humanitarian crises like Somalia and Rwanda are the tip of the iceberg of human suffering. The slow death of millions through poverty and malnutrition are just as pressing cases for humanitarian intervention.

Chapter 26: European integration and regional co-operation
• The Second World War and its aftermath provided much impetus for a change in the nature of relations between the European states.
• Sectoral integration, driven by a smaller core of six countries, led to the creation of the European Communities.
• Powers and competences of the European institutions were gradually expanded in a move from economic to political integration.
• In line with enlargement to a membership of 25 of more countries in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the EU has embarked on an ambitious process of constitutionalization.
• The development of integration theory originated as a branch of International Relations.
• Key debates in integration theory are between supranationalists, emphasizing the role of central institutions, and intergovernmentalists, arguing for the continued relevance of states, their resources and processes of domestic preference formation.
• Contending approaches emphasize different aspects of the integration process. Important distinctions in their focus are: institutional dynamics/state preferences; policy making/treaty reform; long term/short term developments; ideas/interests; and process/events and outcomes.
• Greater theoretical Pluralism, moving beyond the established debate, has developed from the late 1990s onwards.
• The process of integration has interacted with, and received much impetus from, developments at the global level.
• The relationship between processes of globalization and integration is contested: some see integration as a regional expression of globalization, accelerating the transnational nature of markets and thus further disenfranchising states and societies.
• However, the EU can also be regarded as a mechanism through which states and societies regain a degree of control over markets and are able to address transborder issues such as environmental protection, health, migration, or international crime more effectively.
• Multilateral negotiations and global economic competition have provided powerful incentives for cooperation among states on a regional basis.
• Efforts to establish free trade areas and customs unions in Asia and in North and South America received a boost during the 1990s.
• On the whole, these forms of regionalism differ from European integration in only focusing on economic matters and relying on a very limited degree of institutionalization.

Chapter 27: Global trade and finance
• The 'globalization' of economic activity can be understood in several different ways.
• Sceptical interpretations emphasize that current levels of cross-border trade, money movements, and investment flows are neither new nor as great as some claim.
• Globalist interpretations argue that large-scale relaxations of border controls have taken international economic activity to unprecedented levels.
• Geographical conceptions of globalization highlight the proliferation of economic transactions in which territorial distance and borders present limited if any constraint.
• Transborder production and associated intra-firm trade have developed in a number of industries since the middle of the twentieth century.
• Many states have created special economic zones in order to attract so-called 'global factories'.
• Much contemporary commerce involves transborder marketing of global brand-name products.
• The growth of a substantial global dimension to world trade may have discouraged protectionism.
• Globalization has changed forms of money with the spread of transborder currencies, distinctly supraterritorial denominations, digital cash, and global credit cards.
• Globalization has reshaped banking with the growth of supraterritorial deposits, loans, branch networks, and fund transfers.
• Securities markets have gained a global dimension through the development of transborder bonds and stocks, transworld portfolios, and electronic round-the-world trading.
• Globalization has likewise affected the instruments and modes of trading on derivatives markets.
• Global trade and finance have spread unevenly between different regions and different circles of people.
• Transborder commerce has to date often widened material inequalities within and between countries.
• Territorial geography continues to be important in the contemporary globalizing economy.
• Although lacking Westphalian sovereign powers, states exercise significant influence in global trade and finance.
• While economic globalization has weakened cultural diversity and national attachments in some respects, it has promoted them in others.

Chapter 29: Poverty, development and hunger
• The monetary-based conception of poverty has been almost universalized among governments and international organizations since 1945.
• Poverty is interpreted as a condition suffered by people—the majority of whom are female—who do not earn enough money to satisfy their basic material requirements in the market-place.
• Developed countries have regarded poverty as being something external to them and a defining feature of the Third World. This view has provided justification for the former to help 'develop' the latter by promoting their further integration into the global market.
• However, such poverty is increasingly endured by significant sectors of the population in the North, as well as the Third World, hence rendering traditional categories less useful.
• A critical alternative view of poverty places more emphasis on lack of access to community-regulated common resources, community ties and spiritual values.
• Poverty moved up the global political agenda at the start of the twenty-first century.
• In 1945 the USA had carte blanche to set up a liberal international economic order, the institutional pillars of which were the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT. Yet governments were responsive to the demands of national security, and embedded liberalism was the order of the day.
• The cold war stimulated competition between the West and the East to win allies in the developing world. Most of the latter were born into the Western international economy and saw their development within the context of that system, i.e. based on growth within a free market, but also they stressed the role of the state in promoting development.
• Progress was achieved up to the 1980s according to the orthodox development criteria of GDP per capita, economic growth, and industrialization. Yet despite apparent success in conventional terms, there has been an explosive widening of the gap between the richest and poorest 20 per cent of the world's population, and the developing countries as a group entered the 1990s more indebted than the 1980s. Most of the countries of the former Eastern bloc or Second World, now known as the economies in transition from central planning to free market, have suffered a rapid economic decline in the 1990s and effectively joined the Third World.
• Trickle-down has been discredited, and it has been recognized that economic growth only reduces poverty if accompanied by specific economic and social policies.
• In recognition of the failure of economic growth-based indices of development, the UNDP Human Development Index was designed in 1990 to measure development in terms of longevity, education, and average purchasing power.
• National poverty reduction strategies, a response to perceived shortcomings in the development orthodoxy, are criticized on issues of national ownership and policy content.
• Dependency theorists see the current predicament of the Third World as predictable, arguing that export oriented, free-market development promoted in the Third World has increased the wealth of the West and of Southern elites.
• The last two decades of the twentieth century saw increasing debate about what constitutes development, with NGOs and grassroots activists playing a significant role.
• An alternative view of development emerged, based on the transformation of existing power structures which uphold the status quo. Such structures vary in scope from the global to the local, and these are often interlinked; for example, the global economy severely disadvantages the poorest 20 per cent of the global population, whilst at a local level access to common resources affects the ability of people to provide for themselves.
• Grassroots organizations challenge entrenched power structures as people defend their rights, as they define them, seeking local control and empowerment. Development in this alternative view can be seen as facilitating a community's progress on its own terms. The Alternative Declarations of NGOs at global conferences have stressed community participation, empowerment, equity, self-reliance, and sustainability.
• The development orthodoxy remains essentially unchanged. However, the mainstream debate has shifted from growth to sustainable development—the view that current development should not be at the expense of future generations or the natural environment.
• The orthodox view asserts that sustainable development is to be achieved by further growth within a global free-market economy. This is the most effective way to maximize global wealth creation. Supporters believe that this will free up resources to care for the environment and to ensure social progress.
• This approach has been approved by the UNCED and the Copenhagen Summit, both of which legitimated further global integration via the free market. However, in the run-up to Copenhagen, many developing countries advocated embedded Liberalism rather than pure free-market economics, as necessary to help meet the basic needs of their people and ensure political stability.
• Critical alternative views of development have been effectively neutralized by the formal incorporation of their language and concerns into the orthodox view. Nevertheless, the process of incorporation has resulted in some small positive changes in the implementation of the orthodox view, for example by the World Bank.
• Nevertheless, despite semantic changes, fundamental questions remain about the sustainability of the dominant model of development.
• In recent decades global food production has burgeoned, but paradoxically hunger and malnourishment remain widespread.
• The orthodox explanation for the continued existence of hunger is that population growth outstrips food production.
• An alternative explanation for the continuation of hunger focuses on lack of access or entitlement to available food. Access and entitlement are affected by factors such as the North-South global divide; particular national policies; rural-urban divides; class; gender; and race.
• Globalization can simultaneously contribute to increased food production and increased hunger.

Chapter 31: Human rights
• The international human rights regime is an established feature of contemporary world society, and a good example of the processes of globalization.
• Modern thinking distinguishes between three generations of rights: first, broadly political; second, economic and social; third, the rights of peoples.
• One major set of contemporary problems concerns compliance, enforcement and the politics of human rights.
• More recently, the universal status of human rights has come to be challenged by critics who stress the Western, masculine, intolerant nature of this universalism.
• We need to establish the status of rights—what a right is, what kind of rights people have, whether rights imply duties, and why.
• The distinction between rights as claims, liberties, powers, and immunities helps to clarify these questions.
• The origin of thinking about rights can be traced to two features of medieval political and intellectual life, the doctrine of natural law and the political practice of extracting charters of liberties.
• Natural law generates universal rights and duties, while a Charter confers local and particular liberties. The actual rights and liberties conveyed by Charters may be compatible with natural law, but this compatibility cannot be relied upon and a potential conflict exists between these two sources of the idea of rights.
• From out of medieval theory and practice a synthesis emerged, the liberal position on human rights, which combines universal and particularist thinking—universal rights established by a contract between rulers and ruled.
• This position is conceptually suspect, but politically and rhetorically powerful.
• Nineteenth-century Liberalism supported international humanitarian reform but within the limits of the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.
• For some Liberals these latter norms did not apply when the standards of civilization were in question. Twentieth-century thinking on human rights has been less restrictive, largely because of the horrors of the World Wars and the Holocaust.
• The politics of the Universal Declaration of 1948 allow us to identify the three major human rights issues of the post-1945 era.
• First, there is the contest between the old norm of sovereignty and the new norm of universal domestic standards.
• Second, there is the contest between political and liberal and social and economic formulations of human rights.
• Finally, there is the assertion of the rights of peoples to be different.
• The politics of rights varies according to whether constitutional or non-constitutional regimes are involved.
• In any event, the international community rarely acts on human rights cases unless public opinion is engaged.
• Economic and social rights are conceptually different from political rights, and present a more basic challenge to existing norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.
• The human rights template severely limits the degree of acceptable variation in social practices.
• This universalism can be challenged on feminist grounds as privileging patriarchy.
• More generally, the liberal position on rights privileges a particular account of human dignity.
• Cultural critics of universal rights such as proponents of 'Asian Values' can be seen as self-serving, but no neutral criteria for assessing this criticism can exist.
• But a set of basic rights may be defensible, likewise the idea of a human rights culture.

Chapter 32: Globalization and the transformation of political community
• The members of a political community are committed to governing themselves.
• Totalitarian states attempted to make the political community absolute but liberal-democratic states recognize that their citizens value their membership of many communities including the nation-state.
• Because they expected to be involved in major wars, states have tried to persuade their citizens to place obligations to the state ahead of duties to other communities, whether local or global.
• Globalization and the declining significance of military competition between the great powers have raised the question of whether political communities will become more cosmopolitan in future.
• Most forms of political community in human history have not represented the nation or the people.
• The idea that the state should represent the nation is a European development which has dominated politics for just over two hundred years.
• War and capitalism are two reasons why the nation-state became the dominant form of political community.
• The extraordinary power of modern states—the growth of their 'intensive' and 'extensive' power—made global empires possible.
• States have been principal architects of globalization over the last four centuries.
• The global spread of the sovereign state and nationalism are key examples of globalization.
• Demands for citizenship rights emerged in response to the growing power of the modern state.
• The demand to be treated as a citizen was initially concerned with securing legal and political rights but citizenship was redefined early in the twentieth century to include social or welfare rights.
• The stability of modern forms of political community has owed a great deal to the fact that citizens won these rights.
• Modernization theory argued that Western liberal democracy had solved the social conflicts which earlier dominated industrial societies.
• Modernization theory also assumed that non-Western societies would follow the Western path of economic and political development. This controversial thesis resurfaced in the West at the end of the bipolar era.
• Globalization and fragmentation are two phenomena challenging traditional conceptions of political community and national citizenship.
• Ethnic fragmentation is one reason for the failed state in Europe as well as in the Third World, but demands for the recognition of cultural differences exist in all political communities.
• Globalization theorists have argued for cosmopolitan democracy on the grounds that national democracies are less able to influence global forces which affect them.
• The ‘war against terror’ has sharpened the division between a ‘Hobbesian’ conception of national security politics and the ‘Kantian’ belief in the possibility of perpetual peace.
• The apex of nationalism in relations between the Great Powers occurred in the first half of the twentieth century.
• Nationalism remains a powerful force in the modern world but globalization and fragmentation have led to discussions about the possibility of new forms of political community.
• Cosmopolitan approaches which envisage an international system in which all individuals are respected as equal have flourished in the contemporary phase of globalization.
• Communitarians argue that most people value their membership of a particular political community; they are unlikely to shift their loyalty from the nation-state to the human race.
• Post-modern writers argue that all forms of political community contain the danger of generating the domination or exclusion of significant sections of society.

Chapter 33: Globalization and the post-cold war order
• It is difficult to make out the characteristics of the contemporary order.
• Because we live in the midst of it, it is hard to get any sense of historical perspective.
• Our understanding of, say, the inter-war period (1919-39) is coloured by how it ended, but we do not yet know how our present period will 'end'.
• We can see that international and transnational connections are a very important element of contemporary order because of currently high levels of interdependence.
• When we speak of order, we need to specify order for whom—states, peoples, groups, or individuals.
• International order focuses on stable and peaceful relations between states, often related to the balance of power. It is primarily about military security.
• World order is concerned with other values, such as justice, development, rights, and emancipation.
• A pattern of order may advance some values at the expense of others. There is often a tension, for example, between state centred concepts of order, and those that promote individual values. For instance, policies based on the balance of power might lead to assistance being given to regimes with bad human rights records.
• A key question about globalization is whether it supercedes all ideas of international order, or whether it can be incorporated into more traditional ideas.
• Order is shaped by the changed nature of states and of the tasks they perform.
• There are complex questions about whether the end of the cold war has released a new agenda of nationalism and national identity or whether these issues have been present all along.
• Security is increasingly being dealt with on a multilateral basis even when this does not conform to classical 'collective security' models.
• The global economy is primarily shaped by relations between the three key America, Western Europe and East Asia), and is managed by a panoply of Western-dominated institutions.
• There are dense patterns of international institutions in all functional areas.
• There are strong trends towards regionalism, but they take different forms in various regions.
• Matters to do with human rights have a much higher profile than in earlier historical periods.
• Globalization is often portrayed as an effect of the end of the cold war because this led to its further geographical spread.
• At the same time, globalization has to be understood as one of the factors that caused the end of the cold war. It was the Soviet Union's marginalization from processes of globalization that revealed, and intensified, its weaknesses.
• Accordingly, globalization is an element of continuity between the cold war and post-cold war orders, and the latter should not be regarded as wholly new.
• A variety of authors are sceptical about the claim that globalization is the hallmark of contemporary order.
• One of the reasons is that, as a long term historical trend, globalization is not specific to the late twentieth, nor the early twenty-first, century.
• Globalization embodies a range of often competing values.
• Globalization is too much outside our control to form an order. We are its objects rather than its subjects.
• There is evidence of resistance to globalization.
• Some of this is generated by the feeling that traditional democracy does not offer effective representation in the global order.
• National elections may not make politicians accountable if they cannot control wider global forces.
• There is a heated debate about whether global civil society can help democratize international institutions, or whether they themselves are largely undemocratic.
• Some governments in the South remain suspicious of social movements that may be better organized in developed countries.
• Globalization is often thought of as an extreme form of interdependence. This sees it largely as a change in the external environment in which states find themselves.
• The implication of such analyses is that states are now much weaker as actors. Consequently, they are in retreat or becoming obsolete.
• If this were the case, ideas of international order would be much less relevant to our concept of order.
• But if globalization is considered as a transformation in the nature of states themselves, it suggests states are still central to the discussion of order: they are different but not obsolete. This leads to the idea of a globalized state as a state form.
• In this case, there is no contradiction between the norms and rules of a state system, operating alongside globalized states.
• This international order will nonetheless have different norms and rules in recognition of the new nature of states and their transformed functions. Rules of sovereignty and non-intervention are undergoing change as symptoms of this adaptation.